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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PETER MART JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
RANGHILD V. JORGENSEN,

Case No. 8618

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDAN'T AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and defendant were born in Denmark and were acquainted with one another before
immigrating to America. The defendant arrived in
this country about seven months after the plaintiff.
They were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on
May 6, 1922. (R. 14) There are two children issue
of the marriage, both of whom are of age and
married. ( R. 14)
The plaintiff is a florist by trade. In 1932
he started in business for himself. In addition to
her household duties the defendant worked in the
business with him, confining her efforts mostly to
the retail part of it. (R. 54, 55) In 1949 they took
over the Hyland Floral on a lease from one John
Quist, which they operated as a partnership. (R.
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17) The defendant continued to work in the business with the plaintiff until December 10, 1955,
when he ordered her off the business premises. ( R.
56, 95) Both parties worked diligently, whereby
they acquired fixed assets of a considerable value '
and also derived a substantial income from the operation of the Hyland Floral business (R. 176-183, 1
35-40).
I

The parties experienced no marital difficulty ·
until 1938 or '39, when they had trouble over the
plaintiff's attentions to a Mrs. Rigmor Tronier.
( R. 57, 9 7) This storm blew over and they lived a
happy married life until plaintiff became interested
in one Marie Antoinette Nielson in 1953 while the
defendant was on a trip to Denmark. (R. 59). Defendant first learned of this situation in November
of 1954. ( R. 63, 102). Although she had observed
a change in plaintiff's attitude toward her. (R. 98,
99) Attempts at reconciliation were unsuccessful.
(R. 110)
On or about August 30, 1955, the plaintiff refused to pennit the defendant to continue to participate in the affairs of the floral business and comnlenced an action for divorce. ( R. 129, 130) Defendant didn't \Yant a divorce (R. 106, 109, 110), but
when the action was conunenced, counterclaimed
and as a result of the trial she was granted the di\'oi·ee. The court made disposition of some 9f the pro2
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perty of the parties and entered its decree with respect to other property interests.
STA'TEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DECREE IS INDEFINITE AND DOES NOT
ADJUDICATE THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES.
POINT II.
THE DECREE DOES NOT MAKE AN EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECREE IS INDEFINITE AND DOES NOT
ADJUDICATE THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES.

At the outset should be kept in mind that the
parties were actually partners in the operation of
the Hyland Floral business and even though the
defendant does not wish to continue in this business relationship with plaintiff (R. 127, 128, 129),
the court requires her to do so against her will.
Although a partner, the decree gives her no right
in the control or management of the business. Paragraph 2 is quoted as follows ( R. 206) :
"That until the further order of the
court the partnership existing between the
parties known as Hyland Floral be and the
same hereby is continued, the p'laintiff, nevertheless, to receive the sum of $500.00 per
month from the partnership business as a
management fee in connection therewith, the
3
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to be paid before the net partnership
earnings are determined between the plaintiff
a~~ defendant, which net earnings shall be
divided and paid over to the parties on or
before the expiration of sixty days from the
close of ~ach annual accounting period, the
net earnings to be after repayment of all
advan~es and borrowings incident to the partnership or appropr~ate reserves for the same·
that said partnership, until otherwise ordered
by the court, shall be managed and operated
by the plaintiff, and during such time the
defendant shall haYe no active part in the
management thereof and she hereby is restrained from interfering with said business
and competing in the same line of business
on her own account or \vith others; that the
defendant shall have access at all reasonable
times to the books and records of said partnership for the purpose of inspection."
The foregoing pro,-isions giYe the exclusive
n1anagen1en t of the business to the plaintiff and
he receives $500.00 per n1onth from the partnership as cmnpensation. In her counterclaim the defendant asks for a dissolution of the partnership
and an accounting of the property and assets. The
(l\·irlence of defendant's drinking, Exhibit 2D (R.
100, 133), his using the partnership funds to purchase uraniu1n stock ( R. 43, 96) and his personal
conduct, \vas not such as to inspire confidence in his
ability to operate the business, which in the past
has been successfully operated by the family as a
unit. Can the rltlfendant be blamed if she no longer

~
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, desires to be associated with the plaintiff even as a
limited partner? These parties have enjoyed a successful marriage and together have raised their
children. She didn't want this divorce. Attempts to
reconcile their differences ( R. 110) were futile.
On two occasions she humbled herself and went to
the plaintiff and asked him to consider the matter
and come back home (R. 133). He refused even to
discuss the rna tter.
Why compel the defendant to continue in a
partnership relation with plaintiff after the marriage relation is dissolved? Does such a requirement
constitute a disposition of the property belonging
to the parties? Why compel the defendant to assume
the responsibility of checking books and records of
the partnership to make sure that the business is
being properly managed? That is to say, that the
business is operated in a businesslike manner and
that proper reserves are being laid aside, that
proper repairs and replacements are being made?
Why compel the defendant to assume any responsibility with respect to the operation of said business, in her own interest, by permitting the business
to be continued under the management of the plaintiff "until the further order of the court." We submit that the court has no authority and no jurisdiction in the first instance to enter any decree
except one which definitely disposes of the property
5
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a definite distribution between the parties. He
lS not authorized to enter a decree under which for j
an indefinite period plaintiff shall receive $500.00 'l
per month and whereby the court presides over the
destinies of the parties, reserving unto himself the
power to alter or change their relations with respect
to their property as he may at some future time
see fit. What future conditions will prompt the
court to terminate this partnership even if the court
had the power to continue it? We are not informed.
No time is set. \Yill the court choose to supervise
the operation of the business and later determine
when the time is propitious for a dissolution? The
statute confers no such power upon the court.
Paragraph 3 of the Decree, (R. 206, 207) provides that:
\

''3. That the division of property as
set forth in the findings of fact herein be and
the same hereby is confirmed, and in connection therewith the property at what is commonly known as 4580 \Vallace Lan~, Sa~t La~e
City, Utah, and particularly descr1bed 1n sa1d
findings is ordered sold, the proceeds of ~e
sale to be divided equally between the parties,
the sale price to be not less than $53,500.00,
and subject to the payment of costs and o~~
i terns mentioned in said findings, and 1t lS
further ordered that the parties execute all
appropriate docun1ents to effectuate said sale
and that either party may purchase the interest of the other at such sale, and that the
court retain jurisdiction to effectuate and
6
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carry out the same; that defendant is entitle?
to live in the home at 4580 Wallace Lane until
the same is sold or until defendant secures
the possession of t~e home adjacent to ~he
Colonial Flower business property as hereinafter decreed, whichever occurs first in point
of time."
Paragraph 8 of the Decree, ( R. 208, 209) provides:
"8. That the property described in the
findings of fact herein as the Hillside property shall remain in joint tenacy subject to
the mutual control and disposition of the
same by the parties and subject to the further order of this court, and in the interim
the parties each to pay one-half of the cost
of maintenance, including taxes."
Paragraph 9 of the Decree, ( R. 209) provides:
"9. That the plaintiff be and he hereby
is ordered and directed to pay to the defendant alimony in the sum of $350.00 per month
until the Wallace Lane home property is sold
or until possession of the home adjacent to the
Colonial Flower business property on 9th
South Street in Salt Lake City and County,
State of Utah, can be obtained for defendant's
use, whichever occurs first in point of time;
that so long as plaintiff is obligated to pay
alimony hereunder defendant is entitled to
collect and receive the rents from the Colonial
Flower property in the total sum of $300.00
per month, $150.00 of which shall be applied
to the payment of said alimony; that upon the
contingencies in this paragraph stated, the
payment of alimony to the defendant shall
cease and terminate; that alimony payments
7
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shal1 commence to coincide with the next rental payment from the Colonial Flower property and shall be thereafter payable on the
monthly anniversary date of such rental payments.''
Paragraph 10 of the Decree, (R. 209) provides:
"10. That the Colonial Flower business
property shall remain in joint tenancy and
that the rental payments under the present
lease shall be divided equally between plaintiff and defendant, provided, however, that
as soon as may be done the home adjoining
said Colonial Flower business property shall
be severed as to title and the home shall become and remain the sole property of the defendant; that the court shall retain jurisdiction to effectuate such transfer and division."
The foregoing provisions of the decree are objectionable for many reasons. The statute, Section
30-3-5, provides:
''When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such order in relation to the
children, property and parties and the maintenance of the parties and children as may
be equitable; * * * such subsequent changes or
new orders may be made by the court with
respect to * * * the distribution of property
as may be reasonable and proper."
We submit that this statute has been disregarded. The statute specifically requires that the
Court shall first make such orders in relation to
the property as may be equitable. This requirement
is a condition precedent to making any "new orders
8
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1

* * * with respect to * * * the distribution of property", and even when it makes the new orders,
they must, of course, be "reasonable and proper."
Every decree should be certain and definite
and the statute contemplates finality in the decree
unless conditions change which make "new orders"
advisable. Our court in Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 89
Utah 554, 58 P. 2d 11, referring to the Statute
30-3-5, makes this statement:
"The power of a court to make amendments in particulars authorized by the statute just quoted is not without limits. Thus,
in the absence of changed conditions or circumstances a modification of a decree may
not be had.'' (Citing cases.)
Of course, we are not here concerned with "new
orders" which change or alter the decree. We are
concerned only with the decree itself which should,
under the statute, make a definite and final distribution of the property before the Court would have
any jurisdiction to make any new order. This the
Court has not done.
As stated in the case of Luithle vs. Luithle,
(Wash.) 161 P. 2d 152:
"It is now accepted as a fundamental
proposition that in a divorce action the court
has complete jurisdiction of all the property
of the parties whether community or separate, and may dispose of it in such manner as
is equitable and just under all the circumstances." (citing cases)
9
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The court then quotes from an earlier Washington case:
"This language (as now contained in
Rem. Revised Statutes Section 989) is comprehensive; it is an equitable division of the
property rights of the parties that the court
is authorized to make. * * * The parties shall
bring into court all their property and a complete showing must be made. Each party must
lay down before the chancellor all that he or
she has, and after an examination into the
whole case, he makes an equitable division.
* * * The law does not require an equal division of the property, but a 'just and equitable' division, and as no general rule for a
just and equitable division can be laid down,
but each case must be adjusted according to
its own merits and the particular circumstances surrounding it, the court investigates
all the circumstances.''
In Holm vs. Holm, (Wash.) 178 P. 2d 725,
729, the court referring to a statute similar to our
own, remarks:
"'This section of the statute fixes no arbitrary, nor any hard and fast, rule by which
the disposition of property between parties
to a divorce action is to be determined; nor
are such questions determinable by any rule
of law less general than the statutory rule
itself. Kolbe v. Kolbe, 50 Wash. 298, 97 P.
236; Leonhard v. Leonhard, 147 Wash. 311,
265 P. 1118; Van Kleffens v. Van Kleffens,
150 Wash. 685, 27 4 P. 708. It will be noted
that the statute simply, but emphatically, requires the court to make a 'just and equitable' disposition of the property, having re10
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gard to the merits of the parties, the conditions in which they will be left by the divorce,
the particular sources through which the property was acquired, and the burdens imposed
upon it for the benefit of the children.

*

*

*

*

"With reference to the power of the
court in making disposition of property in
divorce cases, it is well established in this
state that all of the property of the parties,
whether it be community property or separate property, is before the court, for such disposition as is just and equitable under the
facts and circumstances of the particular
case. Jeffers v. Jeffers, 199 Wash. 393, 91
P. 2d 1005; Luithle v. Luithle, 23 Wash. 2d
494, 161 P. 2d 152."
Take the home property at 4580 Wallace Lane,
referred to in paragraph 3 of the Decree above
quoted, and which is held in joint tenancy (Finding
6, R. 197). Why should the court deprive defendant
of her home and compel her to live on 9th South?
Has the court the right to require that she accept
a home where she does not choose to live? She is the
innocent party and should be entitled as a part of
the partnership assets to have the home awarded
to her. Her claim to the home should be resolved in
her favor as against the guilty party, her husband.
But the court says it shall be sold and the proceeds
divided, but that it cannot be sold for less than $53,500.00. When is it to be sold? No time limit is set.
Is the court to call in the parties and say "now is
11
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is the time to sell"? Suppose the parties cannot agree
on the price at which the property is to be sold, or
that they cannot agree as to the terms of the sale.
How then is the sale to be accomplished? Perhaps the
court assumes there will be cooperation between
the parties, but that time has passed. They want,
and should have, no further dealings with one another. The court has made no disposition of this
property any more than it made disposition of the
partnership business. By its decree it has left these
rna tters "in the air". In other words, it has made no
equitable distribution or division.
This home property was not awarded to defendant presumably because a part of the acreage
has heretofore been used for growing bulbs sold
from Hyland Floral, but if the property is to be
sold, it cannot then be beneficial to the Hyland
Floral business.
The same is true of the 12.56 acres of hillside
property valued at $49,500.00. The court decrees
that it shall continue to be held in joint tenancy
"subject to mutual control and disposition by the
parties and subject to the further order of the court,
and in the interim the parties each to pay one-half
the cost of maintenance, including taxes." This property is to be held in joint tenancy with right of
survivorship the same as the Wallace Lane property.
It belongs equally to both parties. That is, each has
12
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the same title or interest in the property as the
other, and the court specificaily perpetuates this
joint tenancy. Perpetuating titles as they were at the
time the divorce suit was filed and at the time the
decree was entered is not an equitable disposition
or distribution of the property between the parties.
It is no disposition whatever of the property.
The Colonial Flower property, by specific provision of the decree, is also to remain in joint tenancy and the rents equally divided. Again the court
obliges the parties to contact or deal with each other,
because if there is an equal division of the rentals,
the parties cannot avoid contact with one another.
This arrangement, that is, the continuation of the
joint tenancy and the division of the rents is to be
continued until "as soon as may be", the flower
shop "shall be severed as to title and the home shall
become and remain the sole property of defendant."
And then the defendant must accept the home in
place of her home on Wallace Lane.
As to the Wallace Lane home, the Hillside property and the Colonial Flower property, the court
decrees that notwithstanding the divorce, the titles
remain as before the divorce, that is, the parties
hold as joint tenants until the sale of the Wailace
Lane home or until the further order of the court.
"An estate held in joint tenancy is but
one estate, not a number of estates equal to
the number of joint tenants, and for some
13
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purposes the joint tenants are as one person.
Each joint tenant is seized of the whole estate;
he has an undivided share of the whole estate rather than the whole of an undivided
share. Each tenant is said to hold per my et
per tout, by the half and by the whole. The
shares or interests of joint tenants are presumed to be equal, although the contrary may
be shown by proof." 48 C.J.S., 930
"Survivorship is a distinctive characteristic of an estate in joint tenancy. On the
death of a joint tenant, the property descends
to the survivor or survivors, and at length
to the last survivor." 48 C.J.S. 910-911
A joint tenant may sell his interest, thus causing a severance of the joint tenancy and creating a
tenancy in common between his co-tenant and the
purchaser. 33 C.J.S., 914.
What is to prevent either party from selling
his or her interest in these properties pending the
"further order of the Court"? Then the other party
would have adjustments to make with the new cotenant. Or suppose one of the parties should die,
the survivor would have full ownership of all property held in joint tenancy in addition to the property a warded to him or her by the court, or does
the court notwithstanding the divorce reserve jurisdiction to compel some sort of settlement by the survivor with the personal representative of the deceased? There are all these uncertainties as to what
may occur, all these probabilities of disagreements
1·1
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as to the prices at which the joint property shall be
sold, and the terms of sale; the time when it shall
be sold; its r.aanagement pending a sale, or pending
the "further order of the court," all because the trial
court failed to make a definite, certain and complete
division of the property as contemplated by the statute.
In the case of Shaffer vs. Shaffer, (Wash.) 262
P. 2d 763, a certain apartment house and its furnishings were awarded to the plaintiff and defendant as "joint owners or tenants in common." The
property was the principal asset of the parties. The
court quotes the statute, which provides, among
other things, that it shall make "such disposition
of the property of the parties, either community or
separate, as shall appear just and equitable", and
then declares :
"The trial court has a wide discretion in
this regard, but the result of the decree in the
case at bar is to leave the Aloha Street property the same as if it were community property of the parties which had not been before
the court for disposition. They became tenants
in common of any community property not
disposed of by the decree. * * * This was not
a performance of the court's statutory duty.
"'The wisdom of the legislative requirement is well illustrated by this case. Because
of the inadequacies in the decree, future litigation, including a partition action, between the
parties may be necessary. They should not be
left with this prospect. They have a right to
15
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have their respective interests in their property after they are divorced definitely and
finally determined in the decree which divorces them."
Our Statute, Section 30-3-5, provides:
"When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to
to * * * property * * * as may be equitable."
True, the statute also provides:
"Subsequent changes or new orders may
be made by the court with respect to * * *
the distribution of property as may be reas·
onable and proper."
But, as before stated, we are not here concerned
with "subsequent changes" or "new orders". We
are complaining of the decree as entered.
This Court in Smith vs. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291
P. 298, declares:
"The settlement of property rights between the parties is an incident to every decree of divorce where there is any property
involved." (Citing cases.)
"In Roe vs. Roe, 52 Kan. 724, 35 P. 808,
39 Am. St. Rep. 367, it is said that the final
judgment in an action granting a divorce
settles all property rights of the parties, and
is a bar to action afterwards brought by either
party to determine the question of alimony,
or any property rights which might have been
settled by such judgment."
The Court will observe that while by paragraph 9 of the decree it is provided "That so long
16
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as plaintiff is obligated to pay alimony hereunder
defendant is entitled to collect and receive the rents
from the Colonial Flower property in the total sum
of $300.00 per month, $150.00 of which shall be
applied to the payment of said alimony", while in
paragraph 10 the decree provides "that the rental
payments under the present lease shall be divided
equally between the plaintiff and defendant" until
there is a severance of the home adjoining the Colonial Flower business so as to provide a new home
for the defendant. These provisions are inconsistent.
We respectively submit that there has been no
equitable distribution or division of the properties
to which we have referred; that as to said properties
the decree is so incomplete and so indefinite with
respect to what is to happen in the future, that it
has no finality. The court has attempted to reserve
unto himself powers which the statute does not confer upon him and he has in other respects left the
divorced parties in a situation which m~y very
easily result in disputes and controversies with respect to the property they are compelled to hold in
common both as to the management of it and as to
the sale of it, that the decree does not do equity
between the parties; that it does not conclude all
matters which at a dissolution of their marriage
should have been finally and completely settled be17
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tween them. The court's wide discretionary power
does not authorize it to render a decree that is incomplete and uncertain as to property that is to
be disposed of under powers which the court undertakes to reserve unto itself. The ultimate result will
be to continue this litigation between these parties
interminably with a constant reopening of old
wounds, the reliving of old grievances and the resulting emotional disturbance will foredoom any
attempt on the part of either to get their lives back
on a normal plane.
POINT II.
'THE DECREE DOES NOT MAKE AN EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

On the date of the trial plaintiff was 55 years
of age; defendant was 52 years. The trial court's
Memorandum Decision lists the real property accumulated during coverture, the title to all of which
is in their joint names with the exception of one
tract of 2.56 acres which is in the name of the plaintiff only. However, this tract was purchased from
funds obtained from the Hyland Floral business
and both parties have a joint interest in it. ( R. 80)
In fact, plaintiff was not aware that title was in
his name only until the trial ( R. 80) .
The decree provides the Hyland Floral partnership is continued until further order of the court,
the plaintiff to receive the sun1 of $500.00 a month
18
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as a management fee, which he is paid before net
partnership earnings are continued. (R. 206) Why
should the defendant be required to contribute
$250.00 per n1onth towards the salary of the plaintiff in whom she lacks confidence and with whom
she no longer wishes to be associated in business.
Is this payment to continue until the full duration
of the lease, until June 1, 1959 and then for the additional period of four years if the option to renew
the lease is exercised?
The cash surrender on the life insurance policies
awarded to the defendant amounts to $627.00. She
was awarded the New York Life policy, number
21351613, which has a cash surrender value of
$2,109.33 (R. 10), however, this latter policy was
her separate property in which plaintiff had no
interest. Plaintiff was awarded the balance of the
insurance policies, including a Commercial Travelers
Insurance Company policy, number 22766 (R. 211)
(This policy is not included in the list on Rec. 10 as
counsel were not aware of its existence until after
said list had been compiled.) Total cash surrender
value of the policies awarded to the plaintiff is
$4,141.15, as compared to $627.00, the cash surrender value of the policies awarded to defendant.
Plaintiff was also awarded the uranium stock
and oil lease ( R. 207). The evidence showed that
while most of the uranium stock had no market
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value at the time of trial, the 10,000 shares of Blue
Lizzard stock had a value of 11c a share, or $1,100.00
( R. 23, 24) . The oil lease was subleased to the
California Oil and Development Company, for which
the plaintiff receives a rental. The purchase price
of this lease was $1,000.00 (R. 87)
It seems that an equitable division of the foregoing property would require that the defendant
receive at least half of the value thereof.
The decree provides that the home on Wallace
Lane, where the parties have lived the last thirteen
years of their married life, is to be sold and the proceeds divided, presumably because it is a ten room
home. Defendant testified that she lived only in part
of it, the upper rooms being used when she was
visited by grandchildren or friends ( R. 17 0) . Is
it unreasonable for defendant to want to continue
to live in this home which has great sentimental
value to her? (R. 137) Which is also located in a
neighborhood where her friends and relatives live.
The decree awards the residence adjacent to the
Colonial Floral to the defendant as a home (R. 209,
p. 5 Memorandum Decision), now under lease and
which is an integral part of the Colonial Floral business. The heat from this residence is supplied by a
plant located on the floral premises ( R. 179). The
residence and the floral business are and have been
operated as one unit, and in the interests of busi20
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ness efficiency should probably be so operated in
the future. Again we say, why should the defendant
be required to move into a home or neighborhood
which she considers less desirable than where she
now is and has spent some of the happiest years of
her life? It is true that until the year 1956 the plaintiff used three acres of the Wallace Lane home property in which to plant flowers and bulbs, which
\Vas pa:rt of the operation of the Hyland Floral. If
this property is awarded to the defendant, is there
any reason why the use of these three acres for this
purpose cannot be continued? Defendant testified
that she has no objection so long as the plaintiff
assumed any expense connected with said use (R.
136).
We anticipate that plaintiff will contend that it
is not economically feasible to liquidate the Hyland
Floral business before the expiration of the lease
term. If this is so, in equity, why should not this
property be awarded to the plaintiff as his sole
and separate property and the defendant be awarded
the equivalent of her interest in the Hyland Floral
from the defendant's share of real estate now held
in the joint names of the parties.
This Court has often affirmed the principle
that no firm rule can be uniformly applied in all
divorce cases; that the distribution of property and
awarding of alimony must be determined by the
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circumstances of each case. Defendant contends that
she should be a warded the home property on Wallace
Lane. If necessary for the operation of Hyland
Floral, plaintiff to have the right to farm three
acres of that property for the duration of the Hyland
Floral lease; that she should be awarded one-half
of the value of the remaining property, all of which
has been accumulated by the joint efforts of the
parties during their married life ( R. 108). That in
addition the plaintiff should be required to pay her
alimony in the sum of $350.00 per month in order
that she may continue to live according to the station which she had enjoyed before this divorce. She
is 52 years of age and her opportunities for remarriage, even if desired, are limited. Her health is not
good (R. 106, 108, 114) and with advancing age
will probably not improve. The floral business is
all she knows ( R. 106) , which is hard work and
beyond her physical ability except perhaps in a
supervisory capacity.
There is no evidence to support plaintiff's allegations of cruelty on the part of the defendant.
Her conversation with Mickelson, the family friend
and financial advisor, was at the suggestion of the
boys, both of whom at that time were working in
the Hyland Floral business (R. 105). Her conversation with the Bishop of her church was motivated
by a desire to effect a reconciliation with the plaintiff.
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It is recognized that there is no authority in
the laws of this state for administering punitive
measures in a divorce judgment, however, the court
may consider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the
parties to the marriage vows and their relative
guilt or innocence in causing the breakup of the
marriage. This Court in Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77
Utah 157, 292 P. 2d 214, said
"We think the rule contended for by the
plaintiff is the correct rule, and is in line with
the later cases from this jurisdiction. Of
course, the rights and equities of both parties
are to be considered, but, whatever doubt
there may be concerning the rna tter, it ought
to be resolved against the guilty party whose
fault and wrongs and breaches of the marital
relation destroyed the home and forced or
brought about the separation.
"In Decker v. Decker, supra, the court said:
" 'It is also a rule of equity in such cases
that the wife shall not be put in a worse condition by reason of her marriage, the dissolution of which has been caused by her husband's willful misconduct. 'Equity and good
conscience require that the husband shall not
profit by his own wrong, and that restitution
shall be made to the wife of the property
which she brought to the husband, or a suitable sum in lieu thereof be allowed out of his
estate, so far as may be done consistently with
the preservation of the rights of each, and also
that a fair division shall be made, taking into
consideration the relative wants, circumstances and necessities of each, of the property
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accumulated by their joint efforts and savings.'
"The court there further stated:
"'After the equities of the parties in the
property are adjusted, then the husband
should be caused to pay or not to pay a further sum for support and maintenance in
money payments at stated intervals, according to whether or not the wife is equitably
entitled to further payment after a consideration of all the facts that enter into a proper
solution of that question.'
"In Van Gordor v. Van Gordor, supra, the court
said:
"'Upon the law of the case, natural justice requires that at least one-half of the
property, representing the joint accumulations of husband and wife for a lifetime,
should go to the wife, where she obtains a
decree of divorce through the fault of the
husband. Where, as in this case, the husband
and wife have lived together until she is unable to perform hard labor, and have, by their
joint labor, management and economy, acquired property sufficient to support them
both comfortably when living together, certainly when the wife is forced by the misconduct of the husband to seek separation, she
ought to receive sufficient property to support
her comfortably, living alone, without reference to her ability to work and contribute to
her own support.'"
See also MacDonald vs. MacDonald, 120 Utah
573~ 236 P. 2d 1066, and lVilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah
2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977.
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Paragraph 11 of the Decree also provides that
neither party shall recover costs or attorneys' fees
from the other. Again it is recognized that the
awarding of these items is discretionary with the
court and depend upon the particular circumstances,
however, inasmuch as the defendant did not want
this divorce and in fact did everything she possibly
could to save the marriage, in equity she should be
awarded her attorneys' fees and costs.
CONCLUSirON

We respectfully submit that the Decree of the
trial court should be set aside and: ( 1) that there
be an accounting of the partnership property between the parties and a complete adjudication of
their rights in that real estate now held in joint
tenancy; ( 2) that defendant be awarded the home
property at 4580 Wallace Lane, together with oneha1f of the property accumulated by the parties
during their marriage, and (3) that she be awarded reasonable alimony and attorneys' fees.
Respectfully submitted,
& ALLEN
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.

HANSON, BALDWIN
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